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Organs 
 
Abstract 
In the literature of International Parliamentary Assemblies (IPAs) two interesting questions arise that up 
until now have remained quite unanswered. These questions are: 1) Why do some International 
Organizations have IPAs, whereas others do not?  2) Why are some IPAs stronger than other IPAs? This 
study will look into the explanatory power of scale, the number of participating countries, and the 
operating level, at which stage (regional or international) the institute operates, to answer these 
questions. Four hypotheses are tested with a large-N regression analysis, which includes all International 
Parliamentary Organs and several International Organizations.  The four hypotheses are: 1) Scale has a 
negative effect on the existence of  an IPA. 2) A middle scale has a positive effect on the strength of an 
IPA. 3)  Operating level has a positive effect on the existence of an IPA. 4) Operating level has a positive 
effect on the strength of an IPA. Hypothesis 1 can be accepted, but hypothesis 2 has to be rejected. 
Hypothesis 2 however can be accepted if the direction of the correlation is changed. Operating level 
does not have any effect, so Hypothesis 3 and 4 have to be rejected. Scale does have quite some impact 
on the existence of an IPO and the legislative power of it.   
 
Introduction 
International Parliamentary Assemblies are booming in the world. Before 1945 there were a few IPAs, 
like the International-Parliamentary Union and the Nordic Inter parliamentary union (Cofelice, 2012). The 
number of IPAs increased rapidly after the end of the Second World War in 1945. This is illustrated by 
the following graph: 
 
(Rocabert et al, 2013, p.11) 
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A lot of problems, like terrorism, migration, tax evasion and climate change, do not occur just within a 
country’s borders. In fact, they often ignore these borders, so in order for them to be effectively dealt 
with, international cooperation is required. Therefore international organizations have become both 
more popular and more powerful. In this graph the increased power of IPAs is illustrated:  
 
(Cofelice& Stavridis, 2014, p. 159) 
Currently there are many IPAs, varying  from each other in style,  size, and power. The size and operating 
level of an IO could have an effect on the power and the existence of an IPA. In this research, these will 
be the independent variables. Both the definition and the total number of IPAs are unclear. De Puig 
(2008) states a number of 40, while Kissling (2011) sets up a list of 100 IPAs. Most of the literature about 
IPAs is exploratory, not explanatory, even though small beginnings have been made in this field of 
research as well (Rocabert et al, 2014). Two interesting explanatory questions are: Why do some 
International Organizations have IPAs, whereas other do not? Why are some IPAs stronger than other 
IPAs? The answers of these questions can be very useful for understanding IPAs. The power of an IPA has 
been researched before and a research agenda has been set (Cofelice, 2012), but the findings are only 
preliminary and more evidence and explanations are still required for a complete picture. This study will 
help explain in what conditions an IO will have an IPO and when it will not. Analyzing these questions is 
vital for our understanding of IPAs and for findings ways in which they can increase their democratic 
control and legitimacy. This leads to the research question: Do scale and operating level have an effect  
on whether an international organization has a linked International Parliamentary Organ or not, and on 
the strength of the organ? 
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What is an IPA and why is it relevant? 
Many scholars have tried to define and classify IPAs, but there is no consensus about it. One possible 
clear definition of an IPA is given by Rocabert et al (2014): “an institution that (1) transcends national 
borders, (2) has a collegial organization, (3) and at least some directly or indirectly elected members” (p. 
5). Just like with the definition of an IPA, no clear consensus has been reached on the classification of 
IPAs. Kraft-Kasack (2008) set up a classification in three categories based on the competence of the 
institution. Kissling (2014) made her own classification based on the degree of institutionalization and 
this leaded to four categories. However, in this study the classification of Sabic will be used. Sabic (2008) 
uses the same classification variable, the degree of institutionalization, but only has two categories: 
International Parliamentary Organs (IPOs) and International Parliamentary Associations (IPAs). IPOs are 
the officially recognized organs of International or Regional Governmental Organizations consisting of 
parliamentarians (Sabic, 2008). IPAs are all other of the international institutions consisting of 
parliamentarians. IPAs and IPOs together are called IPIs. This study will focus on IPOs.  
The increasing amount of IPIs, as well as their increasing power and relevance, has caught the attention 
of scholars for quite a while (Cutler, 2013), because these unknown institutions make important 
decisions affecting a lot of people (Kissling, 2011). Rocabert et al (2014) however signal a big problem on 
the global stage: “parliaments are regarded as losers of internationalization” (p. 1). A lot of decisions are 
made internationally and national parliaments are mostly excluded from that decision-making process.  
Negotiations are secretly held by governments. Parliaments are almost forced to accept international 
agreements, because of the involvement of other states. This leads to a ‘take it or leave it’ situation and 
parliaments cannot make changes in the agreements. One of the possible solutions for this democratic 
deficit of the internationalization is to create parliaments on the international level: IPIs. This way 
parliamentarians can influence policy of the IOs more effectively, so the legitimacy of the IOs will 
increase. However, Slaughter (2004) spots a problem with this solution: “many existing regional 
‘parliaments’ or ‘assemblies’ are quite ineffective” (p. 1064). The increasing number of IPIs and the 
increasing power of some IPIs raise questions that should be studied by scholars. There is still a lot 
unclear about, for example, the democratic deficit of the international stage and the effectiveness of 
IPIs. 
 
State of the literature about IPIs 
Over the last years IPIs have been studied more and more, and not just exploratory (Cutler, 
2001,2006,2013; Cofelice, 2013; Costa and Dri, 2013; De Puig, 2004; Kissling, 2014; Lenz, 2013a; Lucci, 
2013; Navarro, 2010; Rüland & Bechle, 2014) (As cited in Rocabert et al, 2014, p. 2). In the field of 
international parliamentary assemblies, a lot of research has been done regarding the strongest one: the 
European Parliament (Hix, 2006; Hix & Høyland, 2014; McElroy, 2006). Research has also been done 
regarding European IPIs, like the OSCE and the Council of Europe (Kraft-Kasack, 2008; Habegge, 2010). A 
lot of research has been exploratory or in-depth for a couple of IPIs, but studies on all IPIs or large-N IPIs 
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are scarce (Kissling, 2011). A large-N empirical explanatory analysis would be a good contribution to the 
literature. 
As discussed in the last chapter, increasing internationalization has been leading to a parliament deficit 
and decreasing legitimacy of IOs. Kraft-Kasack (2008) splits the legitimacy in two parts: input and output. 
The output legitimacy increases through internationalization, because of effective allocation, and 
decreases the input legitimacy, because of the lack of democratic control. Held (1995) states that IPIs are 
a solution for this problem: They are able to act as norm-entrepreneur, and decrease the democratic 
deficit (Held, 1995). Countries and scholars argue that democratic control is needed at this international 
level, and IPIs have an important role here to facilitate that democratic control. 
There are a lot of international organizations, but only a small fraction of them have a linked IPO. The 
literature does not provide a satisfactory explanation. It would be interesting to know what factors can 
help to create an IPO at an IO, which is sometimes proposed, like the case was at the WTO. But why has 
the creation of an IPO failed and when would it succeed? Having an IPO would increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the IO. Explanations for the emergence of these IPOs are scarce in the literature. Some 
scholars, however, like Lenz and Navarro, do offer explanations. Lenz (2013a, 2013b) emphasizes on 
norms, just like Held (1995), and the way norm entrepreneurs can change the world system by adding 
democratic norms, like IPIs. Navarro (2010), on the other hand, analyzed the establishment of the Pan-
African Parliament. One quite relevant factor from this analysis is the normative standard of the EP 
(Navarro, 2010). These studies are quite normative and this study will be more empirical to help explain 
the emergence of IPOs. 
The most accepted view  of power of the IPIs in the literature is that most IPIs lack it and are, therefore, 
ineffective (Slaughter, 2004). Cutler (2001) is more optimistic in his view of the power of IPIs: Society 
networks have become very important in the world, and  IPIs “may accumulate more functions and 
encourage the creation of new international structures that mediate relations between member States 
and themselves” (Cutler, 2001, p. 236). The power of IPIs is a relatively new research area (De Puig, 
2008; Kissling, 2011; Malamud, 2007; Marschall, 2007; Sabic, 2008; Stavridis, 2007). These works 
extensively explore the power of IPIs, but hardly study the determinants of power. (Stavridis, 2007). In 
this study I hope to contribute to the determinants of power. 
 
Theory 
Conceptualization 
Firstly, the variables need to be conceptualized. An IPI is defined as “an institution that (1) transcends 
national borders, (2) has a collegial organization, (3) and at least some directly or indirectly elected 
members” (Rocabert et al. 2014, p.5). A lot of institutions could be marked as an IPI under this definition. 
In this study I will focus on international parliamentary organs as introduced by Klebes (1990).  
International parliamentary organs (IPOs) are “organs of international governmental organizations 
composed of parliamentarians” (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014, p. 150). The distinction is made by formal 
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recognition of the international organization by means of a treaty. All IPOs are IPIs, but not all IPIs are 
IPOs. For example, there is a NATO parliamentary assembly that is recognized, but not a part of the 
NATO because this has not been incorporated in a treaty (Rocabert et al, 2014). The OCSE also has a 
Parliamentary Assembly that is formally part of the OCSE, so it can be called an IPO. There are 22 IPOs 
(Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). The list of IPOs can be found in annex 1. An International Organization is 
defined as “an institution with formal procedures and a membership comprising three or more states. 
International organizations are characterized by rules that seek to regulate the relations amongst 
member states and by a formal structure that implements and enforces these rules” (Heywood, 2011, p. 
433). There are around 5000 International Governmental Organizations in total (IGO) (UIA, 2015). Most 
of them do not have an IPO, like the United Nations or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, but some do, like the European Union and the Economic Community of the Western-
African States.  Scale is defined as the number of states that participate in the IO or IPO as an official 
member. Observatory or candidate states are not included.  Operating level is defined as the stage on 
which an IO or IPO acts: regional or international. The operating level is decided by the geographical 
location and distribution of the member states. The regions are: America, Europe, Africa, Middle East 
and Asia. If an IO or IPO has members within two regions, it is seen as international.  Power, in its 
broadest sense,  is defined as  “the ability to influence the outcome of events, in the sense of having the 
‘power to’ do something” (Heywood, 2011, p. 210). In the case of an IPO, power can be measured 
through the ability of the IPO to fulfill their five main parliamentary functions: consultative, oversight, 
appointments, legislative and budgetary (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). Institutional capacity is another 
aspect of power, which can be measured through budget (Rocabert et al, 2014). 
 
Hypotheses 
Many possible answers and explanations exist for the research questions. In this study I will focus on and 
test two variables: scale and operating level. These data could be relevant for the answers to the 
questions posed. Scale can have an effect on the power of an IPO. Research has been done regarding the 
relation between size and democracy at the national level (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Garring & Zarecki, 2012). 
The classical thesis is that small size leads to a higher chance of democracy and a more stable 
democracy, but this has been criticized. The idea is that small size would be better for the facilitation of 
grassroots movements (Dahl & Tufte, 1973), but big size would be better for the increased competition 
between the elites within a country (Garring & Zarecki, 2012). The debate about size and democracy can 
also be raised to the international level. The classical thesis has been proved and is generally accepted 
for the existence of democracies: Small states are democracies more often than big states. (Veenendaal, 
2014). Considering the fact that smaller states have a higher chance of being a democracy, this would 
mean, on the international level, that smaller IOs would have a higher chance of an IPO than bigger IOs. 
The stability of the democracy in the classical thesis ,however, is challenged and criticized. Being a bigger 
state could be better for the competition between the elites in the country, for the capacity to maintain 
the democracy and for the avoidance of a monopoly (Garring & Zarecki, 2012). In conclusion, there is no 
real agreement in the literature about the relationship between size and the stability of democracy. At 
the international level you can see power as stability. The existence of an IPO does not mean that an IPO 
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is effective or stable, so it would be hard to theorize if a bigger or smaller IO is better for the power an 
IPO. 
Scale can also affect the existence of an IPO with regard to efficiency. This would lead to the expectation 
that IOs that have a smaller number of members are more likely to have a linked IPO. This is because it is 
easier to compromise and reach a consensus with fewer states. Furthermore, the little number of states, 
logically, makes the IPO smaller. It is, therefore, easier to create and maintain, as well as both cheaper 
and more efficient. This would mean that small IOs have IPOs more often than big IOs.  The same 
efficiency effects as mentioned in the above are relevant for power: having a smaller group of countries 
does make it easier to make decision, but it also means their decisions do not have much impact, 
because the policy only applies to a small region. A big scale, on the other hand, would have a lot of 
impact but because of the large number of different countries an agreement would be hard to achieve. 
Big decisions would hardly be made. As a result, the middle scale of countries would be most effective 
and powerful. These considerations lead to the next two hypotheses: 
H1: The smaller the scale of an IO, the higher the probability that it has an IPO.  
H2: A middle scale has more effect on the strength of an IPO than any other scale. 
The next variable is operating level.  Cutler (2001) states that the international community has become a 
networked society where IPIs may accumulate more functions. Loosely interpreted, it can be stated that 
a community or society will be able to produce networks, where IPIs will be able to gain more power. A 
community is easier to achieve and maintain within a group that has the same culture and language. A 
region often has the same culture and can sometimes be called a community, like the Middle-East and 
the Arab League. In these regional communities it would be easier to achieve agreement about the 
creation of an IPO, and it would be easier for an IPO to produce networks and gain power in these 
communities. 
Operating level can also affect the existence of an IPO with regard to its efficiency. IOs are more likely to 
have IPOs because of their regional focus. Instead, if the focus lies on the international stage all the 
participating countries need to approve the creation of the IPO and it would make policy-making even 
more difficult. It is already  difficult to make international rules for national governments, and with an 
IPO with an extra voice of parliamentarians it would be even more difficult. With a regional focus this 
problem is less evident and it is easier to develop policy. So, the existence of an IPO is more likely within 
regions. The above arguments are also relevant regarding the question of power. IPOs with an 
international focus often do not have a lot of effect on the policy of the linked IO. The international level 
is still mostly dominated by national governments. On the regional level there are more options for IPOs 
to influence policy and have control and power. These considerations lead to my two final hypotheses:   
H3: An IO with a regional operating level has a higher probability to have an IPO than an IO with 
an international operating level. 
H4: An IO with a regional operating level will have a stronger IPO than an IO with an international 
operating level.  
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Research Model 
Case Selection 
The hypotheses need to be tested using empirical data and evidence. The higher the number of IOs and 
IPOs used, the more accurate the results will be. This would mean a large-N analysis. My goal is to 
examine as much IOs as possible and all the IPAs in existence. There are around 5000 IGOs (UIA, 2015) 
and around 50 IPAs (Kraft-Kasack, 2008). The number of IGOs and IPAs is too big to research in this scare 
time. I will only research all the IGOs with a linked IPA: an International Parliamentary Organ, like 
mentioned before. There are 22 international parliamentary Organs of IGOs (Cofelice & Stavridis, 2014). 
For analyzing the existence of an IPO, It is also necessary to look at IGOs without IPO. Because of the 
huge number of IGOs, a selection is required. A selection of 66 IGOs is made based on the list of IGOs 
with an observer status at the UN. These IOs are all multilateral and have quite some meaning for and 
effect on the international stage. This way it can be avoided that the analysis would contain a lot of 
small, unimportant and specific IOs that would never have or need to have an IPO, because they do not 
need parliamentary control. These IGOs, combined with the 22 that have an IPO, lead to a total of 88 
IGOs. The list of IGOs and IPOs can be found in annex 1 and 2. 
 
Operationalization 
This is an empirical study used to estimate the causal impact of  independent variables on a depended 
variable. The data and variables used in this study and required for the testing of the hypotheses are: 
Scale, operating level, existence of an IPO and strength of an IPO. These variables need to be 
operationalized into measurable units. Scale is the country participation of an IO or IPO. This is 
measurable by determining the number of countries that are official members of an IO or IPO. This 
would result in a number between 3 and 193. The data on scale would be analyzed as an absolute 
number. The operating level is the stage on which an IO or IPO acts. The IOs or IPOs will be divided into a 
regional or international level. The stage will be determined by the geographical location of the member 
states. The distinction between regional and international is made through the link to a specific region. 
As soon as an IO or IPO includes two regions or more it’s internationally oriented. In this study the 
regions are: America, Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia. The distinction has exceptions, as regions 
often have one or a couple of states that are close the region or have the same culture, that join the 
organization. This  does not immediately make the organization internationally orientated. This will lead 
to a dichotomous variable. The existence of an IPO depends on whether the IO has an IPO or not. This 
can be divided into yes and no answers. This also leads to a dichotomy variable. To determine whether a 
linked IPO exists, an IPO that has a link with an IO and has the possibility to control the IO needs to be in 
existence. The IPO, thus, has to be mentioned in the treaty of the IO and must have some kind of power. 
The strength of an IPO is the hardest variable to measure. Strength can be based on three sources: 
constitutional status, institutional authority and institutionalization (Rocabert et al. 2014) or in the 
functions of a parliament: consultative, oversight, appointments, legislative and budgetary (Cofelice & 
Stavridis, 2014), which also has some overlap with institutional authority. Together with a group of 
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bachelor thesis students, we combined our strengths to make a codification of this variable that could be 
useful to us all. This way all the variables could be measured and used for the statistical analysis. For the 
institutional authority we used the PPI measure of Cofelice & Stavridis (2014) and made our own coding. 
For institutionalization we used the Budget of an IPO, absolutely and relatively. The codebook of IPO 
power can be found in  annex 3.  
To improve the quality of our explanation variables, control variables need to be taken into account as 
well. There could be a lot of different explanations as to why an IO has a linked IPO, or why it does not, 
and also for the explanations of the power of an IPO besides the variables scale and operating level. In 
this study I will consider the age of the IO or IPO as control variable, for the longer an IO exists, the 
bigger the chance that an IPO could be created. Also: the longer an IPO exists, the bigger the chance that 
is has acquired more power over time. The next control variable is specialization. There could be a 
distinction in whether an IO or IPO is an institution that works on different kinds of issues, or an 
institution that works on one specific kind of issue. This could also affect the explanations and these data 
will be collected and researched.  Hooghe and Marks (2013) also argue that whether an organization is 
general or specific affects the existence of IPIs and they conclude that IOs which are general, more often 
have IPIs.    
 
 
 
Results 
 
Existence IPO 
The data has been collected and analyzed. The data has mainly been analyzed by regression. Regression 
is a solid method to analyze the relation between an independent and dependent variable. The first 
analysis is the dependent variable of existence of an IPO. Because Existence of an IPO is a binary variable 
(yes or no), a binary logistic regression is needed. 
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Table 1: Logistic regression model of existence IPO 
                                                                 Model 
(Constant)                                                        -1,031 
                                                                           (0,966) 
Scale                                                   -0,041*  
                                                                           (0,020) 
Age               0,010 
               (0,016) 
Operating Level (Ref.= international) 
 Regional             0,010 
               (0,737)  
Specialization (Ref.= General) 
 Specialized             1,269* 
               (0,582) 
 
-2LL                                                                    79,064 
Cox and Snell’s R2                                                                 0,202 
Nagelkerke R2                                                                           0,300 
N                                                                         88 
Note: binary logistic regressionanalysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
The Nagelkerke R Square (Cox & Snell could also be looked at, but it is not standardized with a maximum 
of 1) in this model is 0,30. In this model, scale and operating level is used, besides the control variables 
age and specialization. All the variables together have a R square of 0,30. Thirty percent may not be 
much, but it can be quite important, because many factors can explain  the existence of a parliament and 
this is quite a good start for a model. We do need to be cautious with interpreting a pseudo R square, 
but it can be used as a number to show the strength of the model. It is also necessary to look at the 
significance, because the IOs without IPOs are a selected sample and not the whole population.  Two 
variables have a p-value of under 0,05. This means that the null hypotheses can be rejected for scale and 
specialization. There is a significant effect for these variables. The B gives an indication of the strength of 
the effect. For scale the B is -0.041. It is a negative effect. This means that, if scale goes up by 1, the 
chance of existence of an IPO goes down by 0.041. Existence of an IPO is a binary variable, so chance is 
used and it is not numeric. The variance of the variable Scale is 190. The minimum is 3 (Benelux) and the 
maximum is 193 (United Nations). So the total effect of scale can be 190 x 0.041= 7,79. If you look at an 
increase of 10 states, the chance would be 0.41. Those chances are quite high and have high explanatory 
power.  Specialization also has a significant effect. An increase of 1, that also is the maximum increase of 
specialization because it is a binary variable (specialized or general), leads to a higher chance of 1,269 on 
the existence of an IPO. This also is quite a strong predictor, but the conclusion is different from Hooghe 
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and Marks (2013). Specialized IOs more often have IPOs. The difference is that this study only focuses on 
IPOs, whereas Hooghe and Marks studied IPIs. 
Power 
Table 2: Linear regression model of Power 
                                                                 Model 
(Constant)                                                   0,021 
                                                                      (0,151) 
Scale                                              0,003  
                                                                      (0,003) 
Age          0,002 
          (0,003) 
Regional Operating Level        0,150 
           (0,139)  
Specialization                        0,026 
            (0,101) 
 
R                                                                      0.409 
R2                                                                                                      0.168 
Adj. R2                                                                                      - 0.028 
N                                                                     22 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
The next analysis is the power of an IPO. There are 22 IPOs analyzed, which is the entire IPO population. 
In this analysis, the PPI power is used as dependent variable, which is an indicator of institutional 
authority power. PPI is a scale from 0 to 1. The independent variables are the same as before: scale and 
operating level with age and specialization as control variables. This model has an R Square of 0.17. This 
is the normal R Square and ,so, it can be interpreted more safely. 17% of the variance of PPI can be 
explained by the four variables in the model. It is not a lot but it provides some explanation. It also is a 
good start for explaining what factors contribute to the power of an IPO, which a lot of factors can 
explain. No variable in this model has a p-value below 0.05, so there is no significance. The very low N of 
22 can explain this. There is no sample in this model, but rather the data consists of the population. 
Therefore, I argue that significance is not relevant to show that these variables have effect. Caution is 
needed because the variables only have effect on and explanatory power for these 22 cases, and nothing 
outside these cases. The B of scale is 0.03. This is a positive effect. The minimum is 3 and maximum is 57. 
The maximum variation is 54. PPI can maximally be increased by 1.62 by scale. An increase of 10 leads to 
a higher PPI of 0.3. It has quite some effect. This would mean that a bigger IO leads to a stronger IPO, 
contradicting the classical thesis about size and democracy. An increase in operating level of 1, which is 
also the maximum and only increase, only increases the PPI by 0.15. This does not have a lot of effect. An 
increase in age of the IPO adds 0.02 to the PPI. The minimum  age is 9 and the maximum age is 67. The 
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maximum variation is 58. PPI can maximally be increased by 1.16. An increase of 10 leads to a higher PPI 
of 0.2. It does not have as much effect as scale, although it does have some effect. The last variable of 
specialization only has a B of 0.026, while the maximum increase of specialization is 1. It almost has no 
effect on PPI. 
Table 3: Linear regression model of Relative Budget 
                                                                 Model 
(Constant)                                                   34,727 
                                                                      (50,120) 
Scale                                              -0,434  
                                                                      (0,540) 
Age          0,287 
          (0,473) 
Regional Operating Level        -15,663 
           (41,072)  
Specialization                        -14,966 
           (22,063) 
 
R                                                                      0.550 
R2                                                                                                      0.302 
Adj. R2                                                                                      - 0.395 
N                                                                     9 
 
Table 4: Linear regression model of Total log Budget 
                                                                 Model 
(Constant)                                                   5,628** 
                                                                      (1,471) 
Scale                                              -0,025  
                                                                      (0,016) 
Age          8,377E-005 
          (0,014) 
Regional Operating Level        1,184 
          (1,238)  
Specialization                       -0,540 
          (0,596) 
 
R                                                                      0.613 
R2                                                                                                      0.376 
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Adj. R2                                                                                      - 0.040 
N                                                                          11 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
 
The next analysis has the same independent variables, but now uses a different power as dependent 
variable: institutionalization. This can be done in two ways: relative budget, the budget of the IPO 
compared to the budget of the linked IO, or the total budget and then taking the logarithm of the total 
budget to make the differences smaller.  In the analysis of relative budget the R Square is 0,30 and when 
LOGbudget is used it even is 0.38. This does have quite some effect, but because of the small N it would 
be difficult to draw any conclusions. Out of the 22 IPOs, only of 9 the budget of the IPO and IO could be 
found. Of 11 of them the Budget of the IPO could be found. Without more transparency of the budgets 
of the IPOs, we will not be able to draw any useful conclusions about this aspect of power.  
 
Budget and PPI 
The data provided another interesting conclusion. Budget has a very low N, but it was still possible to 
collect some useful information with the data. Budget and PPI are both different aspects of power, but 
they could have some correlation. In the next regression analysis the relation can be seen between PPI 
and LOGbudget: 
 
 
Table 5: Linear regression model of IPI Power 
                                                                 Model 
(Constant)                                                   -1,141** 
                                                                    (0.314) 
Total log Budget                                          0.215***  
                                                                    (0.045) 
 
R                                                                     0.848 
R2                                                                                                      0.720 
Adj. R2                                                                                        0,689 
N                                                                          11 
Note: OLS-Regression analysis with standard errors in parentheses  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, * p < 0,05 
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The R Square is 0.72. Because of the small N, it is better to look at the Adjusted R Square, which is 0.69. 
This is still really high. 69% of the variance of PPI can be explained by LOGbudget. LOGbudget also has a p 
value of 0.001, below 0.05, which means the relation is significant. This is necessary because the N is only 
11 of the 22 cases. The B is 0.215. This means that, if LOGbudget increases with 1, PPI increases by 0.215. 
The minimum is 5.81 and the maximum is 9.23. The maximum variance is 3.42. The maximum increase of 
PPI is 0.735. Those changes are quite big. However, the problem with this relation is that the direction is 
hard to determine. It could mean that, if an IPO has a bigger budget, the IPO has a higher PPI, or that the 
IPO has a bigger budget because of the higher PPI. This data and thesis cannot answer this question, so 
this relation should be researched more. It could be more thoroughly researched if IPOs were more 
transparent.  
 
Scale and PPI 
One last analysis is needed to draw a conclusion on my hypotheses.  The second hypothesis is ‘a middle 
scale has a positive effect on the strength of an IPO’. This is no linear relation, so a linear regression 
cannot test this hypothesis. It, however, can be tested by using a scatterplot with a Loess regression line: 
 
 
There is quite a big increase in PPI between 3 and 8 and between 20-28. 20-28 could be categorized to a 
middle scale, but the increase can mostly be contributed to the outlier of the EP, which has 28 states and 
the highest PPI. Because of the low number of IPIs a Loess regression line is not useful for any 
conclusions and the hypothesis cannot be tested.  
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Conclusion 
H1: The smaller the scale of an IO, the higher the probability that it has an IPO.  
Accepted 
H2: A middle scale has a positive effect on the strength of an IPO.  
Accepted in another direction 
H3: An IO with a regional operating level will have a higher probability to have an IPO than an IO 
with an international operating level. 
Rejected 
H4: An IO with a regional operating level will have a stronger IPO than an IO with an international 
operating level.  
Rejected 
The results of the analyses of the data lead to the rejection of operating level as a determinant of the 
existence of an IPO or power of an IPO. Operating level has not had any significant or strong impact, so 
the community effect of Cutler (2001) does not have a lot of effect on IPOs. Scale ,however, did have 
quite some impact on the existence of an IPO. The smaller the IO, the bigger the chance of the existence 
of an IPO and it also is a quite strong relationship. Hypothesis 1 can, therefore, be accepted. Hypothesis 
2 cannot be tested, because of the small number of cases (N=22), but at the regression analysis we could 
see a quite strong impact of scale on power of an IPO. The bigger the IO, the stronger the IPO. 
Hypothesis 1 follows the classical thesis of democracy and size. However, hypothesis 2 does not follow 
the classical thesis of size and democracy, but rather it follows the theory of Garring and Zarecki (2012). 
The control variable age does not have any effect on the existence of an IPO, but it does have a relatively 
strong effect on the power of an IPO. The control variable specialization hardly has effect on the power 
of an IPO, but it does have a strong effect on the existence of an IPO. The relation between these is 
opposite from Hooghe and Marks (2013). This thesis adds the effect of scale on the existence and power 
of IPOs in the relatively understudied area of International Parliamentary Assemblies. It adds the relation 
between budget and power of IPOs to the research agenda. This is a small empirical step to gain more 
knowledge and to understand these upcoming institutions, but there is still a lot left to research. This 
thesis can help with the understanding of power and emergence of International Parliamentary Organs.  
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Annex 1: List of International Parliamentary Organs 
Number International Parliamentary organ International Organization 
1 Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe Council of Europe 
2 European Parliament European Union 
3 Nordic Council Nordic Cooperation 
4 Benelux Interparliamentary Consultative Council Benelux Economic Union 
5 EFTA Parliamentary Committee European Free Trade Association 
6 Parliamentary Assembly of the Central European 
Initiative  
Central European Initiative 
7 Consultative Council of the Arab Maghreb Union Arab Maghreb Union 
8 Inter-parliamentary Committee of the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union 
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union 
9 ECOWAS Parliament Economic Community of West 
African States 
10 East African Legislative Assembly East African Community 
11 Pan-African Parliament African Union 
12 CEMAC Community Parliament Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa 
13 Andean Parliament Andean Community 
14 Central American Parliament Central American Integration 
System 
15 Mercosur Parliament Mercosur 
16 Assembly of Caribbean Community 
Parliamentarians 
Caribbean Community 
17 Inter Parliamentary Assembly of Member Nations 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States 
18 Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization of the 
Collective Security Treaty 
Organization of the Collective 
Security Treaty 
19 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
20 Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
21 Parliamentary Assembly of the Community of 
Portuguese Language Countries 
Community of Portuguese 
Language Countries 
22 Arab Parliament League of Arab States 
 
Source: Cofelis & Stavridis, p. 152-153 
Excluded: Inter-parliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community. It has been abolished and 
does not exists anymore. 
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Annex 2: List of International Organizations 
Number International Organization 
1 African Development Bank 
2 African Regional Centre for Technology 
3 African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 
4 Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
5 Asian Development Bank 
6 Asian Pacific Group against Money-Laundering 
7 Asian Productivity Organization 
8 Asian-African-Legal Consultative Organization 
9 Association of Caribbean States 
10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
11 Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) 
12 Colombo Plan 
13 Common Fund for Commodities 
14 Commonwealth 
15 Community of Sahelo-Saharan States 
16 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia 
17 Conferencia de Ministros de Justicia de los Países Iberoamericanos 
18 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
19 Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf 
20 Economic Cooperation Organization 
21 Energy Charter Conference 
22 Eurasian Development Bank 
23 Eurasian Economic Community 
24 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
25 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GUUAM) 
26 Hague Conference on Private International Law 
27 Indian Ocean Commission 
28 Inter-American Development Bank 
29 International Centre for Migration Policy Development 
30 International Civil Defence Organization 
31 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of Africa 
32 International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) 
33 International Development Law Organization 
34 International Humanitarian FactFinding Commission 
35 International Hydrographic Organization 
36 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
37 International Organization for Migration 
38 International Organization of la Francophonie 
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39 International Seabed Authority 
40 International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
41 Islamic Development Bank Group 
42 Italian-Latin American Institute 
43 Latin American Economic System 
44 Latin American Energy Organization 
45 Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences 
46 Latin American Integration Association 
47 Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) 
48 OPEC 
49 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
50 Organization of American States 
51 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
52 Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture 
53 Organization of the Islamic Conference 
54 Pacific Islands Forum 
55 Partners in Population and Development 
56 Red Iberoamericana de Cooperación Juridíca Internacional (IberRed) 
57 Regional Center on Small Arms and Light Weapons 
58 Regional Organization for the Protection of the Marine Environment 
59 Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology 
60 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
61 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
62 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) 
63 Southern African Development Community 
64 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies 
65 World Customs Organization 
66 United Nations 
 
Source:  
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP5/CTOC_COP_2010_CRP7x/CTOC_CO
P_2010_CRP7x.pdf 
Exclusion of IOs with IPO, international courts and specialized institutions of an IO. 
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Annex 3: Codebook Power of an IPO 
Codebook for assessing the strength of International Parliamentary Organs 
(IPOs) 
 
Contributors: 
Armin Ademovic 
Sietse Papenborg 
Eef van der Werk 
Vince Vermeiren 
 
Introduction 
This codebook aims to provide the reader with an overview of the measurements used to asses the 
institutional strength of  International Parliamentary Institutions. Building upon the work of Cofelice & 
Stravridis (2014) and Rocabert et al. (2014) we set forth our own operationalization of IPI Power and 
reflect on the choices we made to measure the concept. We will measure two indications of the 
strength of IPOs: the institutional capacity and competences. Institutional capacity will be looked at 
through comparing the budgets of IPOs, while the competences of IPOs are measured through the use 
and (updated) version of the Parliamentary Power Index (PPI), as designed by Cofelice and Stavridis 
(2014). This is done for the cases in Annex 1. 
 
 
Rocabert et al. (2014) conceptualization 
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Cofelice and Stavridis (2014) Power Coding 
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C=consultative 
O=oversight 
A=appointment 
B=budgetary 
L=legislative 
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Institutional Capacity: Budget 
IPI Budget IPI 2015 (in euro’s; 
unadjusted) 
Budget IO 2015 (in 
euro’s; unadjusted) 
Relative budget 
(in % of 
IObudget) 
Council of Europe 16.603.600 442.255.900 3,75 
EFTA PA 1.901.333[1] (total budget 
of secretary and PA) 
19.739.076[2] 9,63 
Ecowas - 528.720.000[3] - 
Parlandino - - - 
CIS - - - 
PABSEC - - - 
Eurasian Economic 
Community 
Terminated Terminated - 
CPLP PA - 1.500.000 - 
EU 1.686.211.469 144.000.000.000 1,17 
Parlacen 13.263.851 - - 
EALA 14.579.090 97.497.884 14,95 
AU 28.574.944[4] 367.260.114[5] 7,77 
Nordic Council 4.433.637 5.360.000 82,72 
Mercosur 1.705.526 - - 
CEI PA - 5.250.000 - 
OSCE(2016) 3.102.000 141.107.600 2,2 
Benelux 641.854 7.956.800 8,066 
UEMOA(2013) - 202.000.000 - 
CEMAC(2013) 8.254.338 89.640.140 9,21 
Caricom - - - 
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IPO Power Index: 
IPO Cons. Oversight App. Budget. Leg. PP 
EP 4 5 4 5 4 0,889 
EALA 3 3 0 1 2 0,333 
CEI PA 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
Parlacen 3 2 1 1 2 0,333 
Eurasec / / / / / / 
CPLP 3 2 0 0 0 0,156 
PACE 4 3 2 1 2 0,444 
Nordic Council 4 3 0 1 2 0,356 
EFTA PA 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
Ecowas PA 4 2 3 4 4 0,667 
Parlandino 3 2 0 1 1 0,244 
CIS 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
PABSEC 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
PAP 3 2 0 1 2 0,289 
CC AMU 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
CSTO 3 0 0 0 0 0,067 
Arab-P 3 2 0 1 0 0,200 
Parlasur 4 3 0 1 2 0,356 
OCSE PA 3 2 0 1 0 0,200 
Benelux PA 2 0 0 1 0 0,089 
UEMOA-P 3 2 2 1 2 0,378 
CEMAC PA 4 4 0 4 3 0,578 
ACCP 3 1 0 1 0 0,156 
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Annex 4: Sources 
  
Power 
 
EP: 
Rules of procedure of the European Parliament, 8th parliament term 2015 
EALA: 
Rules of procedure of the East African Legislative Assembly, 2001 
Treaty establishing the East African Community, 2007 
CEI PA: 
Rules of procedure of the CEI Parliamentary Dimension, 2009 
CEI (2009). Central European Initiative 1989-2009. Trieste: CEI. 
Parlacen: 
Tratado Constitutivo del Parlamento Centroamericano y Otras Instancias Políticas, 1987 
Protocolo de Reformas al Tratado Constitutivo del Parlamento Centroamericano, 2008 
CPLP: 
Estatutos da Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa com revisões de Lisboa, 2007 
Resolução sobre o Estabelecimento da Assembleia Parlamentar da CPLP, 2007 
PACE: 
http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/Powers 
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly (January 2016). Retrieved from 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/RoP/RoP-XML2HTML-EN.asp 
Habegger, B. (2008). Democratic Accountability of International Organizations: Parliamentary 
Control within the Council of Europe and the OSCE and the Prospects for the United Nations. 
Cooperation and Conflict, 45(2), 186-204. 
Nordic Council: 
Etzold, T. (2013). The Case of the Nordic Councils. International Peace Institute, Mapping 
Multilateralism in Transition, 1. 
Nordic Co-operation (1996). Helsinki Treaty. Retrieved from http://www.norden.org/en/om 
samarbejdet-1/nordic-agreements/treaties-and-agreements/basic-agreement/the-helsinki-treaty 
Nordic Council (2016). Decision-making Process in Nordic Council. Retrieved from 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/policy-documents-and-processes-1/decision-making 
process-in-nordic-council 
EFTA PA: 
EFTA (2009). Committtee of Members of Parliament of the EFTA Countries: Rules of Procedure. 
ECOWAS PC: 
Boré, L. & Henkel, F. (2015). Disturbing a Cosy Balance? The ECOWAS Parliament’s Rocky Road to Co-
Decision. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
ECOWAS (2011). ECOWAS Parliament 3rd Legislature: Rules of Procedure 
ECOWAS (1993). ECOWAS Revised Treaty. 
Parlandino: 
Parlandino (2006). Reglamento General del Parlamento Andino. 
Albarracín, J. & Erthal, J. (2009). Candidate Selection, direct Elections and Democracy in integration 
Parliaments: the Case of the Andean Parliament. July 12 to 16; World Congress of Political Science, 1-30, 
retrieved from http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_2406.pdf 
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International Democracy Watch (2012). Andean Parliament. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/andean-parliament 
Parlandino (1997). Additional Protocol to the Treaty establishing the Andean Parliament. 
CIS: 
International Democracy Watch (2012). CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. Retrieved from 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/cis-inter-parliamentary-assembly 
Nadbath, E. (2015). Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Virtual 
Map of Interparliamentary Cooperation (VIPCO), retrieved from 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/projects/paco-project/vipco-1/vipco-factsheet-europe-ipacis.pdf 
PABSEC: 
PABSEC (2015). Rules of Procedure.   
PAP 
PROTOCOL TO THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION RELATING TO THE PAN-AFRICAN 
PARLIAMENT (2014) http://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-constitutive-act-african-union-relating-pan-
african-parliament  
OCSE: 
http://www.oscepa.org/documents/rules-of-procedure/1832-rules-of-procedure-english/file 
Benelux: 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2003/10/28/7adb3dd6-fdad-409f-a58b-
1cbdfa02dc84/publishable_nl.pdf 
UEMOA: 
Traité de l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA): 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/text.jsp?file_id=203554 
CEMAC: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/fr/cemac/trt_cemac.pdf 
convention régissant le parlement communautaire: 
http://www.cemac.int/sites/default/files/documents/files/convention_parlement_cemac.pdf (vertaald 
door: Thibaut Smeyers) 
CARICOM/ACCP: 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/treaties/en/caricom/trt_caricom_2.pdf 
http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/agreement_accp.jsp 
 
Budget: 
Council of Europe PA:  
http://semanticpace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZW
YvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yMTY5OCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5
uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTIxNjk4 
Council of Europe: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/budget 
Efta: 
http://www.efta.int/About-EFTA/EFTA-Budget-748 
CIS:               
http://e-cis.info/page.php?id=22930 
EEC:  
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http://www.inform.kz/eng/article/2724891 
EP and EU: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/policies/eu-annual-budget/2016/ 
Parlacen:  
http://lahora.gt/senalan-alto-costo-e-inoperancia-del-parlamento-centroamericano/ 
EAC and EALA: 
http://www.eala.org/media/view/eala-debates-and-approves-eac-budget 
Pan african Parliament and African Union: 
http://www.saflii.org/au/AUDECISIONS/2015/19.html  
Nordic council: 
http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/financing 
PARLASUR: 
http://parlamentodelmercosur.org/innovaportal/file/151/1/presupuesto_del_parlamento_del_mercosu
r__2014.pdf  
OCSE: 
http://www.osce.org/budget 
OCSE PA: 
https://www.oscepa.org/documents/factsheet/669-factsheet-english/file 
Benelux: 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2012/11/01/evaluatie-van-de-benelux-unie-
samenwerking-vanuit-nederlands-perspectief 
Benelux parlement: 
http://archive.benelux-parlement.eu/docs/02_PlenaireZitting/PV_verslag_maart2014_nl.pdf 
Uemao: 
http://www.agenceecofin.com/gestion-publique/2811-7790-l-uemoa-etablit-son-budget-2013-a-202-
millions 
 
 
Size and Age: 
 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm 
http://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1/countries-and-territories 
http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/benelux-een-oogopslag/ 
http://www.efta.int/about-efta/the-efta-states 
http://www.cei.int/content/member-states 
http://www.maghrebarabe.org/en/uma.cfm 
http://www.uemoa.int/Pages/Home.aspx 
http://www.ecowas.int/member-states/ 
http://www.eac.int/about/overview 
http://www.au.int/en/AU_Member_States 
http://www.cemac.int/apropos 
http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/index.php/andean-community-of-nations 
http://www.sica.int/sica/sica_breve_en.aspx?Idm=2&IdmStyle=2 
http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/v/3862/2/innova.front/en-pocas-palabras 
http://www.caricom.org/ 
http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm 
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http://www.eurasian-ec.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=7 
http://mfa.gov.by/en/organizations/membership/list/cddd96a3f70190b1.html 
http://www.osce.org/states 
http://www.cplp.org/id-2597.aspx 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/arab_league.htm 
http://www.apo-tokyo.org/about/economies/ 
http://www.aalco.int/scripts/view-posting.asp?recordid=3 
http://www.acs-aec.org/index.php?q=about/members-and-associate-members 
http://thecommonwealth.org/member-countries 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/cen-sad-community-sahel-saharan-states 
http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1 
http://www.comjib.org/en/paises-miembro 
https://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexc64c.html?action=GCC 
http://common-fund.org/about-us/members-states/ 
http://www.wcoomd.org/en/about-us/wco-members/membership.aspx 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#FATF 
http://www.icdo.org/en/about-icdo/members/member-states/ 
http://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?page=statesparties_list&listfilter=off 
https://www.isa.org.jm/member-states 
http://www.esteri.it/mae/en/politica_estera/aree_geografiche/americhe/istitutoitalolatinoamericano 
http://www.oecs.org/ 
http://www.oei.es/acercadelaoei.php 
http://www.partners-popdev.org/member-countries/ 
https://recsasec.org/wp/where-we-work/ 
http://ropme.org/1_Member_States_EN.clx 
http://www.mfa.gov.rs/en/foreign-policy/eu/regional-initiatives/seci 
http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/ 
http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/corporate-information/ 
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